Abstract: Jacob Viner's The Customs Union Issue published in 1950 is the one undeniable classic in its field. The first part of the paper traces the development of Viner's thinking on preferential trading arrangements, places his work in context, and clarifies his position on disputed issues. The second part considers the reception of his work, from the enthusiastic early reviewers to the international economists who further developed the theory of customs unions, to contemporary practitioners.
1) Introduction
The economic impact of preferential trading arrangements is one of the most complex and controversial questions in economics. Intense debates rage about the effects of regional and bilateral trade agreements on the welfare of different groups in different countries, and the consequences of these agreements for the multilateral trade liberalisation process 1 .
Jacob Viner's The Customs Union Issue published in 1950 is the one undeniable classic in the field of the economics of preferential trading arrangements 2 . Appreciation of the work began with the early reviews and it quickly became the point of departure for international economists who further developed the theory of customs unions. It remains the most cited work on preferential trading arrangements 3 . Looking back over the history, Mark Blaug (1991 p298) judged that Viner's book "supplied the starting point for every subsequent work on the economics of common markets and free trade areas".
The first purpose of this paper is to provide an account of what shaped Viner's thinking on customs unions; to clarify what Viner wrote and why. This aspect of the paper is historical, aimed at understanding Viner in context. Second, the paper will consider the reception of his work, examining interpretations offered by practitioners who further developed the economics of customs unions. The divergence between historical and practitioner accounts of Viner's work raises general questions about the relationship between contextual history and practitioner history. Why have so many practitioner misreadings of Viner been scientifically fruitful? The third purpose of the paper is to explore how Viner's work functions as a classic for contemporary international economists. There appears to be a reading cycle moving from use of a text by practitioners, to the text becoming a classic, then different uses by practitioners and historians of economics.
2) What Shaped Viner's Thinking on Customs Unions Classical Liberalism and Free-Trade
Viner's intellectual commitment to classical liberalism is clear from his published work and correspondence 4 . For example, through the 1940s he corresponded with Hayek about the formation of the Mont Pelerin Society, although he did not join because he considered that it had become a political organization. There are many letters, especially to Alec Macfie and Lionel
Robbins where his admiration for Adam Smith is clear, and a 1967 letter to Bertil Ohlin where he describes himself as a disciple of Hume.
As an international economist he was a lifelong advocate of free trade in a period when freetrade was not popular, even among his economist colleagues 5 .
Viner's background commitment to free trade was the most important reason for writing the Customs Union Issue.
The Classical Economists on Customs Unions
The picture painted in the international trade literature is of Viner in 1950 announcing to a stunned world that customs unions are not always beneficial to the countries involved, let alone the world as a whole. Viner was keenly interested in the history economic thought from his student days at McGill and Harvard, and aware of discussions of the topic by the classical economists 6 .
As Denis O'Brien (1976) has documented, this supposedly novel insight that customs unions were not always beneficial was the almost universal understanding of the classical economists.
For instance, Adam Smith was strongly opposed to the Methuen treaty with Portugal signed in 1703 which stipulated that there was to be no tax on Portuguese wines or English textiles. JR McCulloch was particularly incensed by the treaty as it forced him to purchase inferior and more expensive Portuguese wine, rather than the French wine McCulloch was rather fond of. Other treaties such as the 1860s Cobden-Chevalier Treaty which included a most-favoured-nation clause received support from economists, because according to O'Brien's carefully documented argument, the benefits of the trade created were believed to exceed the diversion losses, and also because the treaty was thought likely to provoke reductions in general tariff levels. The writings of the classical economists on preferential trading arrangements were the first important influence on Viner's work.
Taussig and the US Tariff Commission
Viner's interest in preferential trading arrangements seems to have been aroused by his Harvard teacher Frank Taussig, who commented extensively on US trade treaties, especially their reciprocity and most-favored-nation clauses (for instance Taussig 1892 Taussig , 1910 Taussig , 1915 . Taussig was generally optimistic about reciprocity arrangements promoting free trade, perhaps because they were then the only tariff reduction game in town 7 . Taussig's underlying question when assessing reciprocity arrangements was whether they helped or hindered the cause of free trade, and was sensitive to the problems of the American practice of making application of the most favoured nation principle (MFN) conditional. Viner learnt from Taussig a practical case-bycase approach and the importance of attention to the institutional details of trade agreements.
Even some of his teacher's specific examples influenced him, for instance Viner's wool and woollen cloth example (Viner 1950 p48) seems based on Taussig's earlier discussion (1910 p171).
After Viner had completed his PhD coursework, Taussig arranged for Viner to work in 1917 and
1918 with the US Tariff Commission as a special expert, contributing to its 1919 report
Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties (United States Tariff Commission 1919 -discussed by Meardon 2011). This detailed work on US trade treaties must have given Viner some insight
into the effects of trade preferences, and the political process surrounding them. Again some specific examples found their way into Viner's later work, such as the US-Hawaii-Cuba sugar trade discussed in the Tariff Commission report which appeared in his later work (Viner 1931b p7).
Early Papers on Reciprocity and the Most Favored Nation Principle
After leaving the Tariff Commission and establishing himself in his new position at University of Chicago, Viner began to write on these issues. An article on preferences in US trade agreements (Viner 1924b) was followed by another article covering similar ground in a Swedish journal (Viner 1931b) . In these articles Viner showed himself a fierce defender of the MFN principle, and not overly concerned about customs unions which he saw as an unimportant and justified exception to the principle. Customs unions at that time, certainly from an American perspective, did not seem to be a major threat to the MFN principle or the wider free-trade agenda. He states that since the MFN principle is "definitely on the defensive" it is time "to examine the objections which have been made" against "equality of treatment in tariff matters" (Viner 1931 p96), irrespective of whether customs unions were perceived as a major current threat to free trade.
Many of the ideas, and even the language, of Viner's skeptical account of customs unions in his 1950 book The Customs Union Issue can be found in the 1924 and 1931 articles. The concept of trade diversion and the harm done by trade diverting agreements are clearly explained. In 1924 he wrote that for the granting country and the world as a whole "reciprocity treaties, even on free-trade grounds, are ordinarily not an amelioration, but on the contrary are an intensification of the evils of customs tariffs. They not only do not counteract the tendency of protective import duties to divert international trade from the channels which it would follow under free trade, but they may cause an even wider departure of trade from its "natural" channels than would result from a regime of uniform protective tariffs at the levels prevalent prior to the grant of partial reductions of duties through reciprocity arrangements." (Viner 1924b p107).
The idea of trade diversion becomes more concrete in his 1931 article on the most favoured nation principle: "A tariff that is high, but uniform in its treatment of imports regardless of their origin, may divert trade from the channels which it would follow if allowed freely to choose its own path much less than would a moderate tariff which applies different treatment to imports according to their country of origin. Suppose that under free trade country A would find it to its advantage to import a particular commodity from country B, and that even with a high duty it is still not possible to produce a commodity at home at a profit to its producers, so that it continues to be imported from B. While the tariff reduces the volume of trade, it does so only as a revenue measure, and still permits the commodity to be produced there where it can be produced most cheaply. Suppose, now, that the duty is reduced by half on imports from a third country, C , and that by virtue of this preferential treatment C can undersell B and capture A's trade. The result of the discrimination in favour of C is that the commodity which could be most cheaply produced in B, and would be produced the even if A had high tariff, provided it was nondiscriminatory, is now produced in C, where the conditions for its production are comparatively unfavourable. The reduction in duty, because it is discriminatory and not uniformly extended to all, operates as a deterrent instead of a stimulus to the optimum allocation of the world's resources in production" (Viner 1931b p5).
Overall he still viewed customs unions favourably: "as a rule, customs unions probably constitute a forward step towards freer trade" (Viner 1931 p10) though he later noted (Viner 1950 p53) that his questioning in print of customs unions began with the 1931 article.
Manitoba Consulting Assignment
Viner's thinking on customs unions developed further through consulting work in the late 1930s
for the Province of Manitoba as part of the Canadian Royal Commission on DominionProvincial Relations 8 . His work framed in customs union terms Manitoba's argument about the detrimental impact on Manitoba of it being part of the Canadian Federation.
For our purposes Viner's (1938) supplementary statement to the Royal Commission is of most interest. There he explained Manitoba's problem that the Canadian federal tariff priced lower cost US producers out of the market, so that goods were instead imported from higher cost Canadian producers, mostly located in Ontario. This diversion of trade affected consumer goods and inputs to Manitoba's agricultural export industries, as well as government purchases. There was little possibility of expansion of the Manitoban export industries as a result of the Canadian tariff, but large benefits to Ontario producers. Viner noted that while terms of trade benefit might also be expected as the tariff would reduce demand for imports, the fact that the foreign demand for Manitoba's exports was almost perfectly elastic meant that the terms of trade benefit to Manitoba would be minimal, and any terms of trade benefit would accrue to Ontario and the industrial Provinces. The case of Manitoba in the Canadian Federation was a clear example of losses due to trade diversion that Viner was later to discuss in The Customs Union Issue.
The Manitoba work was significant not for any conceptual innovation, but because it provided Viner with a concrete example which guided his thinking about the circumstances in which a customs union would lead to losses, and where the losses appeared to be substantial.
Postwar Context
The immediate context for Viner's book on customs unions was the difficult post-World War II situation. He was heavily involved discussions of the post WWII trade and financial architecture, both directly and through his extensive networks of friends and correspondents on both sides of the Atlantic, and through his writings (such as Viner 1946; 1947 and an opportunity for others to disguise protectionism. As he explains in the opening pages of the book "Projects for customs unions and other special tariff arrangements between states independent of each other politically are today widespread, and many persons look to them as at least a partial solution for the major economic and political problems in the international field".
He wishes to "examine them from the point of view of the economist." (Viner 1950 p3) 3) The Customs Union Issue I turn now to what exactly Viner wrote (and didn't write), about which there has been much misunderstanding in the literature.
Viner took a broad view of customs unions, and his analysis is relevant to most preferential trading arrangements. The introductory chapter discusses customs unions as "one of a number of arrangements for reducing tariff barriers between political units while maintaining barriers against imports from outside regions" (p4) while a "perfect customs union" is defined as an arrangement which "meets the following conditions:
(1) the complete elimination of tariffs as between the member territories;
(2) the establishment of a uniform tariff on imports outside the union; Before launching into the analysis of the effects of customs unions Viner points out that "None of these questions can be answered a priori, and the correct answers will depend on just how the customs union operates in practice. All that a priori analysis can do is to demonstrate, within limits, how the customs union must operate if it is to have specific types of consequence" (p43).
He then makes the crucial distinction between commodities "which one of the members of the customs union will now newly import from the other which it formerly did not import from at all because the price of the protected domestic product was lower than the price at any foreign source plus duty" i.e. which involve "a shift from high cost to a lower cost point, a shift which the free trader can properly approve, at least a step in the right direction, even if universal free trade would divert production to a source with still lower costs" (p43) and:
"other commodities which one of the members of the customs union will now newly import from the other whereas before the customs union it imported them from a third country, because that was the cheapest possible source of supply even after payment of duty" i.e. which involve a shift between "a low-cost third country and the other, high-cost, member country". (p43) Noting: "This is a shift of the type which the protectionist approves, but it is not one which the free trader who understands the logic of his own doctrine can properly approve" (p43), and commenting: "simplified as this exposition is, it appears to cover most of the basic economic issues involved" (p44).
It is worth bearing in mind that Viner had been commissioned to write a brief essay introducing a collection of customs union documents aimed at policy makers. Viner here is not claiming to engage in a detailed exercise in welfare economics; instead he is making a simple distinction that he believes is helpful in evaluating customs unions. This way of operating is consistent with his other writings, where he resists self-contained theoretical systems and demonstrative general propositions which purport to settle real-world policy questions.
Reading the Viner passage as some sort of general proposition also ignores the comments that precede and follow it about the impossibility of answering questions about the impact of customs unions a priori. The passage which follows is "From the free trade point of view, whether a particular customs union is a move in the right or in the wrong direction depends, therefore, so far as the argument has yet been carried, on which of the two types of consequences ensue from that customs union." (p44)
If Viner offers welfare propositions it is not on p43-44, but at the end of his brief discussion of the economics of customs unions where he gives a several rules of thumb:
"A customs union is more likely to operate in the free trade direction, whether the appraisal is in terms of its consequences for the customs union area alone or for the world as a whole:
(1) the larger economic area of the customs union and therefore the greater the potential scope internal division of labour;
(2) the lower the 'average' tariff level on imports from outside the customs union area as compared to what the level would be in the absence of customs union;
(3) the greater the correspondence in kind of products of the range of high cost industries as between the different parts of the customs union which were protected by tariffs in both of the member countries before the customs union was established i.e. the less the degree of complementarity -or the greater the degree of rivalry -of the member countries with respect to protected industries, prior to the customs union;
(4) the greater the differences in unit costs for protected industries of the same kind as between the different parts of the customs union, and therefore the greater the economies to be derived from free trade with respect to these industries within the customs union area;
(5) the higher the tariff levels in potential export markets outside the customs union area with respect to commodities in whose production member countries in the customs union would have a comparative advantage under free-trade, and therefore the less the injury resulting from reducing the degree of specialization in production as between the customs union area and the outside world;
(6) the greater the range of protected industries in which an enlargement of the market would result in costs lower than those at which the commodities concerned could be imported from outside the customs union area;
(7) the smaller the range of protected industries for which an enlargement of the market would not result in unit costs lower than those at which the commodity is concerned imported from outside the customs union area but which would nevertheless expand under customs union."
He concludes this discussion of the economics by emphasising that with "customs unions are from a free-trade point of view, not necessarily good nor necessarily bad; the circumstances discussed above are the determining factors" (p51)
As was Viner's habit he follows a simple and suggestive piece of economic theory with a list of qualifications and additional matters which need to be considered in policy discussion. Here the additional matters are the possibility of a customs union being able to exploit market power and improve its terms of trade (bringing gains at the expense of the outside world) (p55), better possibilities of bargaining for tariff reductions (p56), administrative economies flowing from customs unions (p58-64), revenue from duties (p65-68), and the impact of forming a customs union on the degree of monopoly within the union (p75-78). This last issue was especially relevant to the French push at the time for a variant customs union which closed the domestic market to all but members of the customs union, as a way of restricting competition.
Viner showed a keen awareness of the political issues. An important question was the relationship between economic union and political union, because some economists advanced customs unions as a step towards political unions which would help secure a lasting peace.
Viner argued historically that most customs unions that had actually been formed were driven by political rather than economic considerations (p91), that political union always preceded economic union (with the German Zollverein as the only exception p96), and that this is for good reasons (such as the absence of workable redistributive mechanisms). Moreover the most economically beneficial customs unions are the hardest to form (p135), a point rediscovered by Grossman and Helpman (1995) and the contemporary political economy of trade literature.
A comment on this "strange phenomenon" of customs unions pleasing both free traders and protectionists shows his awareness of the political economy issues. He suggests that "Businessmen, however, and governments which have had to try to simultaneously satisfy both special interests seeking increased protection and voters hostile to protection have long known ways of making increased protection look like movement in a free-trade direction" (p48) then
gives an example of another way protectionism can be made to look like free-trade policy. This is when reducing a duty on an input (woollen cloth) increases protection overall (on woollen goods), a situation that would later be considered by the effective protection literature, and an example of what would later be known as the theory of second best.
Viner also offers perceptive commentary on the relationship between customs unions and the multilateral trade liberalization process which was beginning to take shape as he wrote. He feared that in the post-war period customs unions will "almost inevitably operate as a psychological barrier to the realisation of the more desirable but less desired objectives of the Havana Charter --the balanced multilateral reduction of trade barriers on a non-discriminatory basis" (p139) and this has sadly proved true, as discussed by Bhagwati (2008) and others.
These sorts of political considerations are at least as important as the economic arguments about trade diversion to his conclusion that "customs union is only a partial, uncertain and otherwise imperfect means of doing what worldwide non-discriminatory reduction of trade barriers can do more fully, more certainly and more equitably" (p135).
4) Reception of Viner's Work. Early Reviews
Sales of The Customs Union Issue were healthy and all of the reviews in major journals positive 10 . Most reviewers praised Viner for his command of the historical material, and commented on the relevance of the book for current controversies.
A few of the reviews by economists highlighted the analytical contributions for which the book would later be mostly known. For instance Virgil Salera (1951 p84) in the Journal of Political Economy considered it "the first rigorous treatment of the subject" and focused how Viner's trade diversion argument overturned the conventional wisdom that customs unions ere always a good thing. Wolfgang Stolper described the book in his review for the American Economic
Review as "the most cogent analysis of the economics of customs unions to be found in the its application as may at first sight appear to be the case. It is my purpose in these lectures to make a contribution to the analysis which Professor Viner has started." (p34). Meade's criticism is that "Professor Viner's analysis does not tell one how to weigh up the economic gains from some element of trade creation against the economic losses from some other elements of trade diversion" (p34). In order to do this Meade sets out a model which he views as "completely in harmony with the basic analysis which Professor Viner employs" (p36) where "all elasticities of demand are zero, and all elasticities of supply are infinite". In the chapters that follow this model is analysed and extended in various ways, and Meade concludes that "it is impossible to pass judgment upon customs unions in general" (p107). There is no denying the richness of Meade's discussion and the acute powers of insight demonstrated especially in the "rash generalizations" he gives at the end of the lectures (p117-124). They are similar in style to
Viner's propositions discussed above, but more detailed.
Meade claims when developing his model that it is "in harmony" with Viner's, however later in the book there are statements that Viner assumes "constant costs of production" and "zero elasticities of demand" (for instance Meade 1955 p77 (presumably based on a reading of Meade) as emerging from Viner's problematic analysis of the production side. A similar position is taken in his survey Lipsey (1960) , although the statement about Viner's assumptions is softened slightly to "Viner's analysis implicitly assumed that commodities are consumed in some fixed proportion which is independent of the structure of relative prices" (p499).
Lipsey also suggests his analysis is more general and therefore superior, that Viner's insights on customs unions are merely a special case of his general theorem of second-best "There can be no doubt that the theory of customs unions provides an important case study in he application of Viner's suggestion that increasing returns do not greatly affect the analysis of customs unions.
Cooper and Massell
The point of departure from Viner for Cooper and Massell's (1965) Since Viner suggested in the passage that a customs union will lead to either trade creation or trade diversion, Michaely takes this to imply that Viner cannot be working with a strictly convex transformation frontier, and therefore must be assuming constant production coefficients.
Michaely believes he has confirmed the view of Meade and Lipsey that Viner assumed constant, not increasing costs.
The difficulty with Michaely's logic is that he foists on Viner all the other assumptions of his reference model. Equilibria with either trade creation or trade diversion outcomes are possible with different models, especially the more complex models that Viner seems to be working with in his other publications. In his discussion of the real-cost opportunity-cost Next is an examination of consumption affects, and here in Michaely's view Viner is at least consistently mistaken: "Viner's position with respect to the consumption effect of a customs union, unlike his treatment of costs, is unambiguous: he consistently overlooks this element in his analysis." "Indeed, he shows no trace of awareness of the welfare effect of substitution in consumption" and so "the issue to be examined here is not, therefore, whether the consumption effect was neglected or not, but rather the possible sources or interpretations of such neglect"
(p86). Michaely's evidence includes Viner's 1950 Customs Unions Issue and his 1937 Studies in the Theory of International Trade.
In relation to the customs union book he makes the extraordinary statement (p92) that "Viner's disregard of the consumption effect of the establishment of the union was due neither to any specific assumption about the nature of this effect, nor to a decision to concentrate only on the production effect while regarding it as only part of the analysis. It was rather due, it seems, to Viner's lack of awareness of the effect of trade and of tariffs on welfare through substitution in consumption." Instead Viner was simplifying as much as possible to make the conceptual point about the distinction between trade diversion and creation. A few minutes spent with any of Viner's works that discuss the role and limits of economic theory would have been sufficient to save Michaely from this appalling misreading.
In relation to Viner's purported lack of awareness one only needs to open Studies at page 521
where Viner draws consumption indifference curves and describes substitution around the indifference curve in the accompanying text to realise the inaccuracy of the Michaely' claim that Viner was unaware of the effect of trade on welfare through consumption substitution.
We would have to conclude that the Michaely has been unsuccessful in resolving the question of Viner's assumptions in the customs union book. Viner obviously had a model or models in mind when describing the effects of customs unions, but it is unclear exactly what they are. His lack of clarity about his assumptions is partly due to the nature of the book and partly his skepticism of the sort of exercises of which Michaely's paper is a particularly bad example.
Viner's approach is perfectly consistent with views he expressed elsewhere on modeling. Viner (1937 p526) suggested it is appropriate to leave the analysis "in that state of persuasiveness associated with incomplete demonstration which seems to be a universal characteristic of propositions economic theory relating to questions involving human welfare" or Viner (1955 p128) where he suggested "relevance is of supreme importance for economic theory" and "leads to certain rules of guidance as to the procedure we should follow in constructing our theoretical models" including "the practice to start with the simplest and the most rigorous model, and to leave it to a later stage, or to others, to introduce into the model additional variables or other complicating elements". He is scathing in various writings about taking propositions deduced from models directly to policy discussion.
Viner's Subsequent Reflections
Viner makes little reference to the Customs Union Issue in his subsequent writings on international economics, though in the years after 1950 he was increasingly absorbed with questions of intellectual history and published very little on any topic in international economics.
He did however comment in a letter to Paul Wonnacott (a Princeton PhD student working on customs unions) that with the benefit of hindsight he would now put more emphasis on economies of scale and transportation cost savings from relocating production in his analysis, though he admitted a "skepticism … about capacity of economic analysis with its present kit of tools" to answer the important positive and normative questions about customs unions (Viner to Wonnacott 3 Dec 1967).
5) Contextual vs Practitioner History
Turning back to the 1950s, Viner's work was the point of departure for economists such as In the mid-20 th century Viner was in the paradoxical position of being both a practitioner of economics and a pioneer of contextual historical scholarship, as he watched the practice of economics and historical scholarship being driven apart. In the Brown University Convocation address (Viner 1953) he discussed how "scholarship" (for Viner this means contextual historical scholarship) which was increasingly absorbing his time is something different to economic theory and policy which he referred to as "research". He sharply contrasts the sensibilities of scholarship and research, observing that research increasingly generates "material rewards" for the producer and "tangible benefit to the community" (1953 p386) while historical scholarship can now only be pursued for its own sake. Historical scholarship can "distract attention from more vital matters" and be "out of place" (1953 p387).
Viner's position is amplified in the later Harvard lecture where there is a strong distinction between the value of the history of economics for "problem solving" or "throwing light on 6) The Customs Union Issue as a Classic. as I should like to hear it defined, is an author who has enriched the human mind, increased its treasure, and caused it to advance a step; who has discovered some moral and not equivocal truth, or revealed some eternal passion in that heart where all seemed known and discovered; who has expressed his thought, observation, or invention, in no matter what form, only provided it be broad and great, refined and sensible, sane and beautiful in itself".
A better account that pays attention to how classic works actually function is Condren (1985) .
He shows that classic texts in political science are not texts that discuss an essentially political set of issues, nor are they part of a continuous historical discussion, nor are they better in some way than other texts. In other words classics are not as Sainte-Beuve depicts them. What distinguishes classics is that they are exploited by practitioners -"the intellectual community needs them" (Condren 1985 p284). They can be exploited either as an emblem: "a figure exploited as an emblem is a badge of the cohesive group, an abridgement of its values and a mechanism for maintaining identity." (Condren 1985 p256) or authority which "carries weight across dispute and is part of the shared but contentious vocabulary" (Condren 1985 p256).
In the customs union literature Meade, Lipsey and Corden all used Viner as an authority in Condren's sense. Viner stimulated their work and they established the importance of their contributions in relation to Viner, as criticisms or extensions of particular points in The Customs Union Issue. In the contemporary practitioner literature Viner functions more as an emblem, marking out and justifying the existence of customs union theory as a subfield of international economics. Viner's book is one which practitioners must connect their work to, pay due respect, without have to seriously engage.
One piece of evidence for classic texts functioning this way is the continuing interest in classic texts and authors among practitioners despite their disdain for the history of economics. The twenty year explosion of interest in Adam Smith is a good example, reinforced by the superficially of much of it and the astounding diversity of causes to which his name is attached.
In customs union theory there is an extended treatment by the practitioner Andre Sapir of Bela
Balassa's classic Theory of Economic Integration in the latest issue of the Journal of Economic
Literature, a journal that has not published a serious contextual historical piece for many years 20 .
of economists, but a full justification of this claim is beyond e scope of the current article.
Strangely, there has been little discussion in the history of economics literature of the function of classic texts, though history of economics courses tend to be structured around a small number of classic economic texts, as are textbooks that support such courses 21 . In the vast literature on late 18 th and 19 th century "classical" economics, discussion of what actually makes it "classical" tends to be restricted to distinguishing classical economists from those who preceded and followed them on the basis of shared theoretical content rather than the way these texts and authors function for subsequent economists 22 . It is interesting that the authors names as much as the texts themselves come to be used by subsequent economists. Names are perhaps more convenient emblems than texts. In my view this group of late 18 th and 19 th century authors and texts can be described as classical because the way they functioned as emblem and authority for a subsequent group th A further question is whether there is a reading cycle for economic texts, something like the industrial product life cycle where a new product sells rapidly, then sells based on its name in the mature phase, until the product is eventually retired. Viner's Customs Union Issue as we have seen progressed from active use to use as authority and emblem. Does this apply to other economic texts, at least the minority of texts which avoid eventual obscurity? Even if such a reading cycle applies to the political theory texts Condren considered, it may not apply to economics texts because the distinction between history of economics and actual practice is stronger in economics than political theory. What about our own classic texts in the history of economics; for instance the works of Viner, Schumpeter, Samuelson, Blaug and Winch? Do classics function differently for historians of economics than for economist practitioners?
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